The British Intervention in Malaya and the Selangor Incident

by Scott Abel

Malaya rested on a strategically important peninsula between the Indian Ocean and the China Sea. In the middle of the nineteenth century, no single power controlled the Malayan peninsula. Rather, various groups vied for power within Malaya and no indigenous ruler completely controlled the Straits of Malacca, which was a vital seaway that allowed maritime vessels to sail to distant lands. The essay will first examine the attitudes of Britons from throughout the nineteenth century toward Chinese and Malays. Next is a description of the Sultanate of Selangor, the British colonies, and the Straits of Malacca. The description includes political background information on Selangor and the British presence in Malaya. The significant British presence in Malaya contributed to the “Selangor Incident” and the importance of that incident, along with its aftermath will be addressed. The Selangor Incident, a classic example of British gunboat diplomacy, altered the British stance in Selangor from a neutral to an intervening foreign power and reinforced the British perception of the Malays as ruthless pirates.

British colonists in Malaya perceived their neighbors as being a diverse population of varying ethnic backgrounds and characteristics. Thomas John Newbold, a British administrator, published an account of his experiences along the Straits of Malacca in 1839. According to Newbold, the combined native Malays and Chinese populations consisted of the majority of the population with Indians and Europeans as significant minorities. No single ethnic group possessed total control over the Straits of Malacca because the Malays and Chinese composed only half and one-sixth of the total population, respectively.1 Ethnic diversity possessed both advantages and disadvantages because it allowed the immigration of skilled workers, but sometimes diminished the authority of the local Malay chiefs. Despite the problems associated with immigrants, their economic value made them an important segment of Malayan society.

The largest minority, the Chinese, provided the Malayan peninsula with the valuable labor needed for the economic development of Malayan society. Newbold described the Chinese in Malaya as the “most useful class” because Chinese workers surpassed others in handicrafts. Many Chinese workers accumulated wealth through other tasks such as agriculture, lumber, along with the mining of tin, iron, and gold. Local chiefs often extorted, robbed, and murdered Chinese workers for their money.2 One Chinese traveler considered Malays as a “crafty and treacherous” people well versed in piracy, along with a tendency to harass Chinamen.3 Newbold observed the Chinese in Malaya as industrious, intelligent, and literate, which made them excellent workers. Many immigrated to Malaya for work with little money and few possessions, but often hoped to accumulate much wealth there.4 The resentment between the native Malays and the Chinese showed the British that importing industry could not thrive under the current Malay rule because of inadequate judicial processes. Malays sometimes seized what they wanted from foreigners without repercussions or significant legal procedures.

The Chinese became a powerful minority throughout Malaya, but possessed no formal authority. Newbold described the Chinese as selfish, greedy, and voracious gamblers. The Chinese united in secret fraternities for protection, which also became criminal organizations. The Chinese fraternities became political machines that distributed bribes, false testimony, and violence.5 Even though the Chinese possessed no formal authority in Malaya, they voiced their opinions effectively. In one instance, Chinese miners assassinated Chief Tuanku Booju and his family in Selangor.6 The Chinese organized in large numbers and created instability, which made them a power for the Malays and the Europeans to reckon with.

Early nineteenth century British accounts of the East Indies often involved piracy by Malays, likely convincing many Britons that the Straits of Malacca and surrounding seas were pirate havens. The Asiatic Journal, read by Britons, told stories about Malay pirates attacking European vessels. One such case included the capture of the brig Curious in February 1818. An envoy from a local king beckoned the captain, supercargo, and some of the crew ashore, while promising protection for the brig. But his promise was hollow and deceptive. Malay pirates boarded the vessel and murdered the remaining crew.7 In another case, the British ship Hunter, under the command of Captain Hodges, fended off an assault by Malay pirates. According to Hodges, an American schooner was not so lucky because Malay pirates forced the crew off the schooner and captured them. The Malays executed the sole European aboard.8 Although these stories occurred long before the Selangor Incident, they gave an initial impression of the Malays as piratical and ruthless to the British public. The impression remained even when piracy decreased.

Nineteenth century British accounts of Malaya inclined people to believe that pirates infested the Straits of Malacca and the surrounding waters. Newbold described piracy as pervasive, but C. Turnbull wrote in the introduction of the 1971 edition that Newbold’s description of piracy was inaccurate and that piracy declined from 1836 to 1838.9 Regardless of the actual situation, Newbold’s writings on piracy in the region influenced its readers into believing that pirates infested the seas around Malaya. Furthermore, if the local British administration followed some of Newbold’s ideas, counter-piracy patrols would certainly be easier. For example, Newbold suggested the mapping of coastal inlets for easier navigation that would have come in great use.10 Newbold’s account, although questioned, showed information regarding Malaya likely included tales of piracy as he mentioned it early in his work.

Problems within the Sultanate of Selangor threatened regional stability, thus piracy increased much to the chagrin of the British colonists and traders. In the mid-nineteenth century, the main British Straits of Malacca settlements were in Penang, Singapore, and Malacca.11 The British government in the region more-or-less maintained a hands-off policy toward the rest of Malaya, but eventually maintaining such a policy became difficult as a Malayan civil war brought decentralization and piracy.12 The Straits of Malacca was a strategically important navigational passage that permitted maritime vessels to transit between Europe and India to China and the British needed it open. Early British settlements in Malaya made some of their income from agriculture, particularly from spices, gambier, sugar, and coconuts. For a few decades, pepper was the most important crop in Penang and Wellesley Province, but eventually declined because of dropping prices. The settlements cultivated other spices such as cloves and nutmeg.13 Part of British interests in the region, specifically Selangor, was the mining and exportation of tin. A group of tin investors under James Davidson influenced Lord Kimberly, the Secretary of State, in 1873 to support further intervention in Malaya.14 British economic interests in the region primarily came from agriculture and the strategically important position of the colonies along the straits.

Various factions within Selangor sought to expand and protect their interests, even with violence if necessary, at the cost of stability of the sultanate. Chinese secret societies undermined stability through factional disputes and infighting, which received significant British interference.15 Sultan Mohamed of Selangor, a descendent of a Bugis family from Celebes, died in 1857 and Raja Abdul Samad became the sultan in 1859. Civil war erupted in 1866 when Raja Mahdi seized the town of Klang from Raja Abdullah, an ally of the sultan.16 Sultan Abdul Samad sought assistance from Tunku Kudin, the brother to the Sultan of Kedah, to weaken Raja Mahdi. He made Kudin his viceroy in 1868 but did not enforce the proclamation. Foreigners such Yap Ah Loy, a leader of Chinese miners, along with businessmen from Malacca and Singapore supported Kudin against Raja Mahmood, Raja Mahdi, and Syed Mashor.17 One businessman was James Davidson.18 Kudin seized the town of Klang from Mahdi. Mahdi needed money and could easily decide to support pirates to fill his war chest.19 Selangor became a warzone between various factions vying for power, resulting in chaos and the growth of piracy. Any chance of Great Britain remaining neutral became slim, because maintaining low-levels of piracy was difficult without the help of local rulers.

The situation for the British in Malaya changed once the assets of British businessmen began to fall victim to pirates. Kim Seng Cheong, a Chinese junk owned by businessmen in Penang, departed from Penang on June 14, 1871 but failed to arrive at her intended destination. Later reports suggested a group of Malays murdered thirty-four men, women, and children of the passengers and crew and sailed for Selangor. While en route to request help from Colonel Anson, an owner carrying a letter for help saw his missing vessel sailing in the Straits of Malacca.20 Anson dispatched Pluto with policemen under Inspector George Cox to search for the vessel. On June 28, Pluto found the junk in Selangor Town and seized the vessel. Captain Bradley of Pluto, Mr. Cox, and some men searched the surrounding area for the pirates and the cargo.21 The son of Sultan Samad, Raja Musa, assisted the Britons in arresting six suspected pirates identified by a surviving crewman.22 With the help of the Sultan’s son and a bit of luck, the policemen did well in their investigation.

The operation thus far appeared successful, but the Britons did not fully understand the power structure and George Cox’s relentlessness fueled an international incident. Not all the rajas were as helpful. At one point, Syed Mashor and his armed retainers insulted Cox and refused to help him. An apprehended suspect with much money grabbed Raja Mahmood and pleaded for mercy.23 Mahmood convinced the policemen to let him go by promising an investigation into the incident.24 The suspect ran away and believing this was an escape attempt, Mr. Cox pursued him into a stockade, only to find himself at the end of krises.25 Mahmood allowed some of the cargo to be recovered by the policemen to board Pluto, but refused to relinquish some of the property.26 Feeling threatened, many policemen departed quickly leaving Capt. Bradberry, Mr. Cox, and others remaining on the beach. Forced to swim for their lives, the British forces fired seven times at Mahmood’s stockade, replied with insults from Mahmood. The next morning, Musa came aboard and distanced himself from the other three raja.27 With such insults, the British refused to back down and escalated the situation rather than ignoring it even though they did not fully understand the situation.

The series of events that followed became known as the “Selangor Incident,” which altered British involvement in Malaya. Captain Robinson reported the events by a telegram dated July 7, 1871. On June 30, Colonel Anson dispatched HMS Rinaldo under the command of Captain Robinson to find the remaining pirates at large. Rinaldo rendezvoused with Pluto in the Straits of Malacca near the lightship of the North Sand on July 2 and anchored in the Selangor River the next day. Pluto towed ninety-five officers and men under the command of Capt. Robinson in boats. Initially, Commander Grey and the second officer scouted the river in the steamer’s gig to gather information and upon their return, Robinson dispatched three vessels. The pinnace under Lt. Grosvenor Stopford searched the south bank, the cutter under Lt. Eustace Maude searched the north bank, and Sub-lieutenant Williams, accompanied by the junk’s owner and a survivor, searched anchored vessels. After an hour and a half, chaos erupted between the British and Malays, which eventually changed the regional politics.28

Lt. Maude’s landing placed him and his men in the center of Selangor politics and unintentionally in a violent scene. Maude landed asking through a translator for Raja Mahmood, but nobody gave location of Mahmood or his residence. A local said he would get the raja after Maude marched 200 yards down a path, but failed to arrive after ten minutes so he marched a mile further until he met the Raja Mahdi. Maude saluted, shook hands, and escorted him to the shore. The raja escorted by fifty Malays, refused Maude’s invitation to come aboard Pluto because he wanted to cross the river. After Lt. Maude threatened to force him, a combatant opened fire from a house ten yards away resulting in a firefight. The raja and his men fled into the jungle and Maude, wounded by a kris, with his men fled to Pluto, which fired a field piece in support. The engagement cost the party seven men wounded, one mortally.29 The attack on the British party had to be avenged, making the incident even more significant by driving British actions away from neutrality.

On the south side of the river, Stopford and Grey made little progress in the negotiations with Raja Syed Mashor. The raja, guarded by his retainers, stalled in front of the fort and refused to negotiate within the fort over the issues of returning stolen goods or surrendering suspected pirates. Hearing gunfire caused the British to return to their boats to help Lt. Maude.30 Even with offers to negotiate peacefully in the raja’s fort, the Malays refused to deal with the British in regard to the issue of piracy.

Spoiling for a fight, Capt. George Robinson concerned himself more on revenge and the consequences brought by his actions were far reaching. On Robinson’s orders, Pluto steamed to Penang to request for reinforcements, a surgeon, and to also notify the Admiralty. At 6:15 am on July 4, forts fired upon Rinaldo at a distance of 400 yards, wounding three and damaging the sloop. While steaming upstream, Rinaldo fired at the forts and passed the shore batteries line-of-fire. Despite running aground at 10:28 am, the warship fired until 5:30 pm. The conclusion of the bombardment left the fort’s guns silenced and part of the town on fire. Robinson refused to pursue the Malays into the jungle for fear of ambush, but the damage was done.31 Great Britain involved itself directly in the affairs of Selangor, not with the permission of London, but at the insistence of local British authorities and Capt. Robinson.

Not only was the British intervention unprecedented in Selangor, but it contributed to the siding with factions fighting civil war. Robinson permitted reinforcements, the 113 officers and men of the Madras Native Infantry, along with an artillery attachment of one officer and twenty-one men, to land at Selangor Town after a short bombardment. Eventually, Kudin, Mahmood’s enemy, occupied the town with his own soldiers.32 The British backing of Kudin became apparent on July 14, when British administrators Birch and Irving, along with Commander Bloomfield of HMS Teazer visited Sultan Samad with Raja Musa and Kudin in company. The Britons demanded the reaffirmation of the 1868 Decree, placing Kudin as Viceroy, and the outlawing Mahdi, Mahmood, and Syed Mashor, which the sultan proclaimed the next day.33 Another act of gunboat diplomacy, turned the British toward a more aggressive posture where the sultan bent to the will of the local British administrators. British neutrality disappeared and the political situation shifted greatly against Mahdi and his allies.

The Selangor Incident enhanced British prestige in the region and British authorities garnered more respect than before. Before the incident, local rajas treated British authority with disrespect and were not afraid to coerce the British officials to their will. Mahmood, Syed Mashor, and Mahdi either ignored the British officials or treated them with disdain. After the incident, local Malays handed over thieves to British authority, as they now respected it.34 Local leaders certainly looked at the British in a new light after the Selangor Incident.

In Great Britain, although newspapers reported the action favorably, this changed as the politics of the situation became apparent. Initially, newspapers and politicians supported the Robinson’s action against the pirate supporters, but as more information arrived, separate newspapers took different positions. Newspapers such as the Daily News, Hampshire Telegraph, and Sussex Chronicle legitimized the destruction by citing the August 20, 1825 treaty, which forbade local rulers from granting safe haven to pirates.35 The Hull Packet condemned the pirates and their “asylum” with the rajas. The newspaper also declared that Selangor was a “piratical nest” for years.36 As more details became available, some editors changed their minds on the subject. The Manchester Times used Sir Benson Maxwell’s article to address the initial stages of the incident. He criticized Acting-Governor Anson for arresting suspects outside of his jurisdiction, even though Britain had an extradition treaty with Selangor.37 The local colonial authorities involved themselves anyway in Malay internal affairs.

British administrators changed their ideas and policies for the Straits Settlements to a more aggressive stance. Earl Kimberly of the Colonial Office supported the intervention against the pirates, but failed to understand its political ramifications. Gladstone followed Kimberly’s assessment on the matter to intervene only in an emergency.38 Although officially, the policy of non-intervention remained, in reality, the British already intervened politically. The colonial government implemented gunboat diplomacy with the sultan, provided de facto support for Kudin, and fought against several rajas. Therefore, the Selangor Incident and its aftermath caused Great Britain to intervene, regardless of London’s policies.

The Selangor Incident reversed the policy of the Straits Settlements colonial government, contrary to London’s wishes, resulting in the British involvement in the internal affairs of Selangor. Furthermore, the incident inflamed British prejudices toward the Malays as being a piratical people. British gunboat diplomacy and intervention made Great Britain an important faction in the Selangor Civil War. Ironically, the Selangor Incident ultimately brought Selangor and Great Britain closer by forcing factions within Selangor to work with the colonial government of the Straits Settlements.

1 Thomas Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, Vol. I, (New York: Oxford Press, 1971), 8.

2 Newbold, British Settlements in Straits of Malacca, 10.

3 Ta-hai Wang, The Chinaman Abroad, (Shanghai: Mission Press, 1849), 33.

4 Newbold, British Settlements in Straits of Malacca, 11-13.

5 Newbold, British Settlements in Straits of Malacca, 13-14.

6 Newbold, British Settlements in Straits of Malacca, 33, 34, 36.

7 “Borneo,” The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British India and its Dependencies VI (1818).

8 “Malay Pirates,” The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British India and its Dependencies VII (1819).

9 Newbold, British Settlements in Straits of Malacca, ix.

10 Newbold, British Settlements in Straits of Malacca, 37.

11 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964), xiv.

12 L. Mills, “Policy of Non-Intervention,” in Malaysia, Selected Historical Readings, ed. John Bastin and Robin Winks (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1966), 136-137.

13 Mills, “Economic Development in the British Straits Settlements during the early Nineteenth Century.” 152.

14 David McIntyre, “Another Historian’s View,” Malaysia, Selected Historical Readings, ed. John Bastin and Robin Winks (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1966), 204-205.

15 Mills, “Policy of Non-Intervention,” 176-177.

16 Gullick, “British Intevention in Malaya: Background,” in Malaysia, Selected Historical Readings, ed. John Bastin and Robin Winks (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1966), 180-181.

Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 42.

17 Gullick, “British Intevention in Malaya: Background,” 182.

18 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 72.

19 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964), 42, 45.

20 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 48; “The Destruction of Sangalore,” Manchester Times, September 16, 1871.

21 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 48-49.

22 “The Destruction of Sangalore,” Manchester Times, September 16, 1871.

23 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 49.

24 “The Destruction of Sangalore,” Manchester Times, September 16, 1871.

25 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 49.

26 “The Destruction of Sangalore,” Manchester Times, September 16, 1871.

27 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 49-50.

28 Robinson, “Engagement with Pirates,” Manchester Times, September 9, 1871.

29 Robinson, “Engagement with Pirates,” Manchester Times, September 9, 1871;

“Attack on Chinese Pirates by British Seamen,” Liverpool Mercury, September 9, 1871.

30 “Suppression of Piracy on the Malaya Coast,” Daily News, August 26, 1871.

31 Robinson, “Engagement with Pirates,” Manchester Times, September 9, 1871; “Destroying a Nest of Pirates,” Hampshire Telegram, September 9, 1871.

32 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 52-53.

33 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 54-55.

34 C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 57-58.

35 “Suppression of Piracy on the Malaya Coast,” Daily News, August 26, 1871; “Suppression of Piracy on the Malaya Coast,” Hampshire Telegraph, August 30, 1871; “Suppression of Piracy on the Malaya Coast,” Sussex Chronicle, August 30, 1871.

36 “Destruction of a Nest of Pirates,” Hull Packet, September 8, 1871.

“Destruction of a Nest of Pirates,” East Riding Times, September 8, 1871.

37 “The Destruction of Sangalore,” Manchester Times, September 16, 1871.

38 McIntyre, “Another Historian’s View, Malaysia, 199-203.

Bibliography

The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British India and its Dependencies, 1818- 1819.

Bastin, John, and Robin Winks, ed. Malaysia, Selected Historical Readings. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1966.

Daily News, 1871.

East Riding Times, 1871.

Hampshire Telegraph, 1871.

Hull Packet, 1871

Liverpool Mercury, 1871.

Manchester Times, 1871.

Newbold, Thomas. Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, Vol. I. New York: Oxford Press, 1971.

Parkinson, C. British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964.

Sussex Chronicle, 1871.

Wang, Ta-hai. The Chinaman Abroad. Shanghai: Mission Press, 1849.