The Effectiveness of European and American Naval Diplomacy on Japanese Policy

By Scott Abel

The United States, France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain deployed their navies to persuade the Japanese government to establish or extend diplomatic and trade relations with their respective nations. Though Japan caved into the demands of Americans and Europeans, Japan became one of the few states not carved up by European powers during the nineteenth century. This was not necessarily because of stronger defenses developed with the help of western powers, but because naval diplomacy worked and made a further action by European or American powers unnecessary. Eventually, the United States and Great Britain’s relationship with Japan became generally politically and economically advantageous, setting the geopolitical stage for the Pacific Ocean until the advent of World War I.

The United States Department of Navy and the Department of State sought to engage Japan diplomatically in 1852 and establish trade relations through treaty, which would protect American sailors and other citizens in Japanese territory. The United States Secretary of the Navy grew tired of hearing reports regarding the brutal treatment of American citizens at the hands of the Japanese as an attempt to preserve their isolationist policy. Not only did the secretary want the expedition to prevent such brutalities, but also to learn more about the coasts, customs, and people of Japan. The United States wanted Japan to change its law regarding foreigners, especially regarding the laws that required the infliction of punishment upon foreigners washed upon the shores of Japan. The secretary urged the opening of Japan to trade and right of passage to Americans and their European counterparts.1 The United States sought not only the ability to trade with Japan in 1852, but also for its citizens to be safe from prosecution in its lands.

The United States possessed a variety of reasons, mainly for commercial interests, for forcing Japan to open to trade with the West in general. The timing of the mission is significant in regard to the increasing importance of California and the development of the nation’s trade with East Asia. With California becoming a part of the United States, the distance between China and the United States became 2,500 miles, when the United States already possessed the fastest clipper ships in the world.2 The closer proximity in comparison to Europe gave the Americans a competitive commercial edge. Friendly ties with Japan could allow for greater commercial ties with China by acting as a coaling station for American steamships.3 New York businessman Aaron Haight Palmer saw the potential an open Japan might have for US commercial interests. Palmer stated Japan could be the Great Britain of the Pacific and that a blockade of Edo harbor would bring Japan to great potential in time. Given Palmer’s powerful position, he advocated an open trade policy with Japan to the American President and Secretary of State.4 The president agreed, giving way to commercial interests and ordering a form of gunboat diplomacy.

Various Americans had been in Japan before the Perry expedition, having received various degrees of treatment as sailors. US whalers sailed off the coast of Japan in very profitable waters, which presented the likely possibility of Americans being washed ashore in Japan. The Bakufu spoke of executing Christians upon their arrival on Japanese shores, but usually just detained them.5 In Nagasaki, American merchantmen gained more rights in port than their Dutch counterparts.6 Not all reports, however gave such a positive view of Japanese hospitality. Commander Glynn of the United States Navy attempted to retrieve some American sailors from his vessel, USS Preble, in Nagasaki. Thirteen of the survivors claimed to have been treated poorly with the emaciated bodies to prove it from having been locked in a cage for months. Japanese officials forced shipwrecked sailors to trample on a crucifix. While an adventurer named MacDonald had taught at local schools returned in good shape.7 The disturbing reports from American sailors only gave more reasons for Americans to establish a treaty with Japan and prevent such events from occurring in the future.

The Japanese Empire was open to foreign travelers and trade centuries earlier, allowing for exchanges of various sorts across the vast oceans of the world. The Portuguese became the first Europeans to reach Japan in 1543 by landing in Kyushu via a Chinese junk, thus starting a period when Portuguese carracks sold firearms to Japanese clansmen.8 Chinese sanctions against Japanese trade because of the wako or Japanese pirates already cut off the silk trade. In response, Hideyoshi, the leader of Japan, suppressed the wako’s strongholds in Kyushu and attempted to establish a Japanese trade network in Southeast Asia. Hideyoshi permitted international trade through the distribution of documents with the vermilion seal to seaworthy vessels that became known as the “Red-Seal Ships.”9 Although the Japanese rulers disliked the Jesuits that came with the Portuguese, they dealt with them to gain weapons. Oda Nobunaga, the earlier leader of Japan, permitted the Jesuits to work as they both despised the Buddhist power structure. Eventually, 200,000 Japanese joined the ranks of the Catholic Church.10 The Jesuits, however, ran out of luck when they fell from favor with the political establishment.

The rapid change in policy by the Japanese government left a policy that contributed greatly to future isolation. On June 25, 1587, Hideyoshi forced the Jesuits to Kyushu, seizing their assets and eliminating the Christian presence on Japan. Looking for an alternative trading source, he dispatched an embassy to the Philippines. Franciscan friars led the Spanish mission to Japan, despite a papal bull prohibiting their entry to Japan. The Franciscans did not last long after the spread of the rumor that the King of Spain would extend his dominion over Japan, resulting the authorities torturing and crucifing them. Despite such harsh actions, the Japanese still needed the Iberians for trade, so they Hideyoshi allowed them to remain for a time.11 The actions against the Iberians showed why the Japanese government was fearful of Christianity in their nation.

The arrival of the Dutch created another alternative for Japanese to obtain goods from the rest of the world. On April 24, 1600, a Dutch vessel called Love anchored off the shore of Japan with a surviving crew of twenty-four with six capable of standing and the second-in-command English pilot named William Adams. Local Japanese boarded this vessel under the command of Captain Jacob Quaeckernaeck to steal anything they could haul back to land. Eventually, only 18 of the crew survived the lengthy voyage from the Netherlands.12 Regent Ieyasu Tokugawa summoned William Adams to Osaka Castle despite the objections of the Portuguese for an interview regarding the crew’s intentions and weaponry.13 Tokugawa confiscated the cannons from Love and hired the crew for military services for 50,000 real to be spent at the discretion of the local governor. After defeating his opponents at Sekighara on October 21, 1600, Tokugawa reestablished the bakufu and became the shogunate. The sailors from Love helped the Shogun in various ways by training Japanese soldiers how to use weapons and the build seagoing vessels according western designs.14 William Adams and his Dutch shipmates helped bring Japan and the Protestant nations relations closer together, which became relevant to future Japanese trade relations.

Tokugawa gave a brief period of warm trade relations to the Protestant nations of England and the Netherlands. The shogun issued a passport to a Dutch embassy, allowing the nation to trade with Japan into the future.15 The English also dispatched a vessel to Japan called Clove, which arrived on June 11, 1613 under the command of John Saris. William Adams helped his fellow Englishmen establish trade relations with Japan and establish a factory in Hirado for the East India Company, which deployed agents in Osaka, Edo, and Kyoto.16 The English position in Japan was not to last and Japan soon became virtually a closed nation.

After the death of Ieyasu Tokugawa, European trade in Japan collapsed, bringing the years of seclusion upon Japan. The East India Company withdrew because the bakufu relegated its position to Hirado, where the Dutch possessed a corner on the market. The government persecuted missionaries with great fervency and expelled the Portuguese on July 5, 1639.17 The Dutch moved to the artificial island of Deshima off Nagasaki, disembarking their last ship from Hirado on February 10, 1641.18 The Europeans no longer had a significant role in Japanese society for centuries to come, while Japan entered its age of seclusion.

At the time of Perry’s arrival in Japan, the Japanese government was at an impasse resulting in the possibility of change within the closed society. The current political system attempted to freeze Japanese society with 6% of society in the ruling samurai class, with the rest as subjects without political power. Most people had no say in politics and the bakufu or “tent government” of the shogunate generally rejected the implementation of new ideas.19 The shogun, short for Seii Taishogun or “Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary Forces against the Barbarians,”20 enforced the rigidity of society to maintain his family’s control over Japan. Japanese society remained sophisticated despite restrictions with a high literacy rate and an effective education system, which encouraged technological inventiveness. It emphasized cleanliness a great deal and used recycling in society.21 On the brink of a period of great change in Japan, the Shogun became seriously ill and appointed the shrewd Abe Masahiro, a genial nobleman, as the Chief Senior Councilor before Perry’s arrival in Japan.22 The appointment of Abe Masahiro to that position later allowed for much warmer relations between Japan and the United States had a more conservative councilor been appointed.

Commodore Perry prepared the naval expedition to open Japan to American trade in a mission that changed history. Matthew Calbraith Perry became the “Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces, East India, China, and Japan Seas, and Special Envoy to Japan” in a mission as he believed to gather intelligence about Japan and its neighbors in naval and diplomatic manner that emulated British Captain James Cook.23 Perry’s steamer flagship, Mississippi, led two other steamers, Powhatan and Susquehanna, four sloops-of-war, and three supply vessels.24 Before departing on its mission, the fleet assembled at the naval base in Norfolk, Virginia to take on enough victuals for the long voyage to Japan.25 Perry sailed for Japan with the intention of establishing diplomatic ties with Japan, along with gathering information about the nation that could provide useful to his nation.

Perry’s mission to Japan initially resulted in a good deal of tension given the uncertainty over whether fighting would break out, but this came with concept of gunboat diplomacy given the pressure the United States place upon Japan to change its policy during Perry’s visit to Edo Bay. The squadron steamed through Hampton Roads on November 24, 1852, toward Japan via the Cape of Good Hope, reaching Naha of the Ryukyu Islands. The American squadron departed the islands on July 2, 1853 and arrived in Tokyo Bay on July 8, 1853.26 The initial impressions of both Americans and Japanese were of awe at the new things seen. The Americans initially noticed the immensity of Mount Fujiyama and then the impressive defenses of Uraga Bay. The US ships moving against the wind astonished Japanese fishermen.27 The United States’ naval presence in the waters off Japan created tension between the sailors of the American squadron and the local Japanese, as both sides intimidated each other.

The US squadron discovered that the Japanese defenses lacked the necessary firepower to destroy the American vessels, allowing for Perry to call the bakufu’s bluff. Japanese officials negotiated with American Flag Lieutenant John Contee to promise not to land ashore in exchange for keeping Japanese vessels away from the US warships. American Lieutenant Bent commanded a cutter with an armed crew to survey the bay, discovering the Japanese defenses possessed fewer guns than anticipated, along with that the guns ranged from 100 to 200 years old, fired nine to twelve pound shot, and could be easily flanked. The only real threat to the US forces became the 120 Japanese vessels of significant size crewed by twenty to twenty-five men, but the mere blow of whistle scattered a group of Japanese vessels attempting to form a line of battle. The American warships had sixty-eight pounders that could easily outrange the antiquated Japanese coastal defenses.28 Despite such a tactical advantage, US officers, including Perry, preferred not to use force against the Japanese.29 Any military action by either side would not have been in the interests either side, making peaceful negotiations preferable to a use of force.

Diplomacy and common sense prevailed in this instance and talks between Commodore Perry and Japanese officials commenced. On July 14, 1853, Japanese officials called for the Americans to land at Uraga Bay, the forts of which they covered with flags and decorations whereas the officials themselves dressed themselves in full honors.30 Fifteen boats rowed from the American squadron carrying two marine companies and two companies of sailors totaling four hundred men accompanying Perry with his staff of forty officers. To greet him was the Governor of Uraga, Kayama Eizaemon and 6,000 Japanese soldiers.31 Perry and Kayama exchanged their credentials, along with President Millard Fillmore’s letter to the emperor stating his request to open trade relations with translations in Chinese, Dutch, and French. Perry refused to bow to the officials as Americans thought it degrading and vowed to return in the spring.32 After the formalities, the Japanese asked intelligent questions regarding global affairs and exchanged gifts. The US sailors received lacquer ware, eggs, fowl, and various other items, whereas Japanese received food and alcohol while rejecting US weapons. The Americans steamed out the next day, while the Japanese burned American gifts for fear of curses.33 The first contact for Perry ended peacefully, now the bakufu needed to decide what policy to make.

After observing the power of the American fleet, the bakufu needed to decide whether to resist forcibly or to acquiesce to the American gunboat diplomacy. Lord Abe and the bakufu concluded that conflict with the Americans would not be favorable to Japanese interests. The inability to destroy the American fleet would certainly lead to Tokugawa house losing credibility and legitimacy if the bakufu could not fulfill its most important task, along with the possibility of the destruction of the Japanese Empire.34 The bakufu’s was incapable of defending Japan from barbarians, even without an actual invasion by foreign forces, the perception of military weakness might cause political upheaval from various Japanese clans.

The bakufu possessed one asset in its negotiations that permitted a degree of understanding about the United States that actually favored American policy. In 1841, an American whaler ship rescued stranded three Japanese sailors, including one named Manjiro, and returned to the United States. Manjiro, renamed John Mung, lived in New Bedford, Massachusetts with his adopted family who also gave him an education. By 1851, he sailed for Japan, where after his arrival Lord Abe summoned him to learn about the United States. Though the bakufu already made a decision regarding Perry, but Manjiro proved valuable enough to receive a pension and the last name of Nakahama in honor of his hometown.35 Manjiro informed the bakufu that the United States lacked the will to invade Japan, which certainly calmed the nerves of government officials. The bakufu appointed Manjiro ambassador to the United States from 1853 to 1854.36 Manjiro may not have been the decisive in the treaty signing between the United States and Japan, but he reassured the bakufu that a peaceful solution was best.

Perry returned to Japan as stated the year before, ready to negotiate a treaty with the Japanese government regarding trade. The commodore made sure the negotiations took place within the range of US naval guns and demanded more in the negotiations than Washington had ordered, whereas the Japanese kept Manjiro, who could have translated directly, away from the Americans.37 Ultimately, the two powers agreed to the Treaty of Kanagawa on March 31, 1854, which established peaceful diplomatic ties between the two nations. The treaty also established two treaty ports open to trade, Shimoda and Hakodadi where Americans could buy supplies and walk around the ports without restrictions such as those present for foreigners in Nagasaki. In return, the Japanese negotiated the right to tax American goods in the forms of tariffs. The treaty deemed Shimoda the future home of the American consulate. Perry signed the treaty, pending ratification by the US government, whereas three Japanese officials, the Prince of Tsushima, the Prince of Mimasaki, and Udono of the Board of Revenue, approved of the treaty in the Shogun’s absence.38 After months at sea and many tense moments for both Perry and Japan, the signing of the treaty began a new era in Japanese-American relations, permitted by the use of naval diplomacy.

Perry’s expedition to Japan marked only the first chapter of western naval pressures against Japan but was perhaps the most successful instance of an American naval presence in Japan during the 19th century. With Japan opened, other powers raced to make treaties that followed the American example. Perry also accomplished his mission of learning about Japan during his visit there. Furthermore, military action was unnecessary as the Japanese government bowed to pressure placed by Perry’s squadron. The US Navy successfully promoted its nation’s interests, allowing for the beginning of a strong relationship between the United States and Japan that lasted for decades.

1 Navy Department, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, December 4, 1852, March 23, 2004, http://www.history.navy.mil/bios/perry_mc_secnav.html, September 28, 2010.

2 George Feifer, Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American Imperialism in 1853, (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 185.

3 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 189.

4 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 188.

5 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 70, 88.

6 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 37-38.

7 Arthur Walworth, Black Ships off Japan, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1966), 13-14.

8 William de Lange, Pars Japonica: The First Dutch Expedition to Reach the Shores of Japan, (Warren, CT: Floating Worlds Edition, 2006), 158-159.

9 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 159.

10 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 160.

11 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 160-161.

12 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 163-164.

13 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 167-170, 172.

14 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 173-181.

15 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 212.

16 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 217-218.

17 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 219-220.

18 de Lange, Pars Japonica, 221.

19 Feifer, Breaking Open, xix, 44-46.

20 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, xx.

21 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 47.

22 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 2-3.

23 William Heine, With Perry to Japan, trans. Frederic Trautmann, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 5, 7, 8.

24 US Naval History and Heritage Command, “Ships of Expedition to Japan,” March 23, 2004, http://www.history.navy.mil/library/special/perry_openjapan1.htm#ships, November 2, 2010.

25 Heine, With Perry to Japan, 29.

26 US Naval History and Heritage Command, “Mississippi,” Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/m12/mississippi-i.htm ; Heine, With Perry to Japan, 63.

27 Heine, With Perry to Japan, 64; Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 56.

28 Heine, With Perry to Japan, 65-68.

29 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 105, 109.

30 Heine, With Perry to Japan, 70.

31 Heine, With Perry to Japan, 71-72; Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 122-123.

32 Heine, With Perry to Japan, 73-74; Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 124

33 Heine, With Perry to Japan, 5; Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 133.

34 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 119, 135.

35 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 135-136.

36 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 137-138.

37 Feifer, Breaking Open Japan, 238, 244-245.

38 Navy Department, Treaty of Kanagawa, March 31, 1854, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/pearl/kanagawa/friends5.htm, November 2, 2010.