The Beginning of the Imperial Japanese Navy

by Scott Abel

Why did the Japanese Government determine that it needed to build up such a large navy? How did the Japanese build a skilled modern navy from virtually nothing in such a short period of time? How did the Japanese manage to defeat one of the great naval powers in the world so decisively despite being an agrarian society a few generations earlier? The Imperial Japanese Navy played an essential role in the growth of the Japanese Empire and in protecting the vital national interests of the Japanese Government during the early twentieth century. In order for the Imperial Japanese Navy to become a significant naval power in the twentieth century, the Japanese people of the nineteenth century developed the ideological movement to justify naval expansion and the economic means to construct and support a large navy. Japan was able to defeat Russia in the Russo-Japanese War despite being a preindustrial society nearly a half-century earlier by building a strong navy through a process of building up industry, tax reform, large naval budgets, gaining experience, acquiring warships, strong leadership, and training their officers and crew to do their duty with great courage and efficiency.

During the mid to late nineteenth century, there was a movement in Japan lead by intellectuals, journalists, military men, politicians, and nationalists that Japan needed to expand its sovereignty beyond the home islands to places such as the seas to the south of Japan, which required that Japan would need to expand her fleet. A policy advocating southern advancement became known as nanshin, which translates to English as “southern advance.” One pioneer of such ideas was Shiga Shigetaka, who believed not only that Japan should expand its domain over more territories, but that its people should inhabit new lands. The islands of the Pacific would provide major economic benefits to Japan and its people, should the Japanese government decide to seize those territories. As early as the 1870s, Japanese naval leaders believed that the South Seas was an area that provided much potential for the Japanese government. Putting the South Sea Islands under Japanese control would provide the Imperial Japanese Navy with political prestige, strategically important naval bases, and increased budgets due to economic growth. Japan benefitted from the islands even when they were not under Japanese control, because they were benefitting from being a primary exporter to these islands. In 1902, Japan sold 54,502 German Marks worth of exports to the Marianas and the Marianas only imported 57,787 German Marks total worth of goods. Shiga used these ideas as reasoning for expanding the navy’s budget and promoted learning more about Japan’s surroundings and neighbors through training expeditions, despite not being in the navy himself. Another expansionist supporter named Takekoshi Yosaburo wanted to make Japan the “Queen of the Pacific.” The idea of expanding Japan’s navy became popular with officials at the highest levels of government.1

The effect of more high-ranking civilian government officials becoming naval militarists began to reflect in their policies. The government began to pass increasingly higher requests for more money to go to the navy’s budget. One purpose of the funding was so the Imperial Japanese Navy could go on many training cruises starting in the 1880s which would give Japan more knowledge of the seas in the region and the Japanese cadets more knowledge of technical issues. The importance of such exercises was that it made the Japanese officers and crew more familiar with their vessels and the seas surrounding them. The foresight of military officials in seeing the need for these exercises was important, because such exercises were helpful in future conflicts.2

Japan needed the economic means in order to purchase, construct, support, and maintain a navy which helped to protect the nation’s maritime and overseas interests. From around 1885 to 1914, the Japanese government decided to develop the industries required to construct and support a navy such as shipbuilding and steel manufacturing. Such actions were also taken to promote the development of a merchant marine to ensure that Japan could better support its navy among other important things. The Japanese government began to sell off its shipyards in the 1880s, but kept the Yokosuka shipyard. The government decided to focus on developing shipbuilding and navigation skills for national security concerns. During the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese government realized that it did not have a large enough fleet and that it could not borrow foreign vessels to use in the war. To prevent future shortages, the Japanese government decided to enact the Shipping Promotion Law, which promoted private shipyards to construct vessels for companies by granting subsidies. The Navigation Promotion Law was enacted, giving government money to Japanese companies that operated certain vessels. Companies such as the Mitsubishi Steamship Company benefitted greatly from such subsidies. The shipping industry as a whole received seventy-five percent of all subsidies during the years of 1897 to 1913.3

Economists and businessmen, such as Taguchi Ukichi of the South Seas Trading Company, believed that a large navy was necessary to protect the interests of Japanese businesses and to defend Japan. Another important industry for the support and development of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the Steel Industry. The government took control of developing this industry by commencing construction of the Yawata Steel Mill in Fukuoka in 1896. The developments of such industries are essential to maintain an island state at war. Shipyards could be used to repair warships damaged at sea and the merchant vessels could be used to support an army outside of Japan. The main goal of government subsidized heavy industry was to support a military with heavy subsidies for private vessel owners because the Japanese government seized such vessels for military purposes. Taking civilian vessels could support navy warships and the army overseas with supplies.4

Developing a navy during the Industrial Era would be difficult for any nation starting from a preindustrial state. Japan decided to use the European navies as models for the creation of its own navy. This was made easier by the lack of military secrecy that existed during this era. The Japanese people could learn about western technology and techniques without the necessity of covert espionage. Early in the Meiji Era, the Japanese sought assistance from Great Britain for the development in the areas of officer and crew training of Japan’s future warships. Some cadets were sent on training missions on Royal Navy ships and studied in the United Kingdom. Great Britain sent a Royal Marine named Lieutenant Albert G. S. Hawes to initiate an organized form of instruction and to provide discipline on Japanese warships. Hawes arrived in January, 1870, although he was initially disliked for barking orders, but the Japanese sailors quickly adapted and appreciated him. Lieutenant Frank Brinkley of the British army worked with Hawes to teach the Japanese the skills of gunnery, foreign languages, and mathematics. By 1873, thirty-four Royal Navy officers, including Commander Archibald Lucius Douglas, began teaching in Tokyo at the Imperial Naval War College. As a result, the Imperial Japanese Navy could train officers and crew to manage the difficult tasks of maintaining and operating vessels at sea.5

How did the Japanese government manage pay for building up a navy and using it in both times of peace and conflict? In July, 1873, the Japanese government began to transform the tax system from a rice-based system into a monetary system based on a land tax. This land tax was a major source of revenue for the Japanese government and provided the establishment of private property. When politicians, such as Ito Hirobumi, decided that Japan would become an aggressive state with a policy of military adventurism, a fiscally sound budget and war chest was needed to pay for the expensive warships needed for such a policy. For Japan to have enough funds to pay for military expansionism, it needed a fully convertible currency that had a value fixed to a precious metal. Vice Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi was partly responsible for the land reform tax system and was given the task of making Japanese currency convertible when he became the Minister of Finance in October 1881. There needed to be sufficient reserves in the government coffers in order to ensure that the government would not be forced to inflate its currency to pay for precious metals. Matsukata increased the sale of state-owned factories to private companies in order to help restore a fiscal balance. One year later, the Bank of Japan was established so that the government could have greater control over its currency. Japan had been on the silver standard since 1886, but switched to the gold standard once it had enough reserves as a result of the Chinese indemnity from victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.6

War is very expensive and this was no different for Japan around the turn-of-the-century. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 cost the Japanese government about 200 million yen, which was around twice the expenditures of a year of peace at that time and about one eighth of Japan’s Gross National Product. The Japanese government took loans of 43 million yen at five percent interest and 10 million pounds sterling at four percent interest in the London market. The government also instituted an inflation tax to help fund the war effort. Fortunately for Japan, the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki granted Japan an indemnity of 32 million pounds sterling, or one fifth of Japan’s 1896 Gross National Product and control of Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands. Japan paid 1.639 billion yen for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and received no indemnity. This amounted to half of Japan’s Gross National Product at the time. To pay this enormous expense, the Japanese government instituted heavy taxation and borrowed money from foreign nations.7

The Imperial Japanese Navy received its baptism of fire on July 25, 1894 in the first engagement of the Sino-Japanese War. This conflict gave Japanese officers experience in combat, something that the Russian officers lacked in the next war Japan fought. One such officer was Togo Heihachiro, who served in the Sino-Japanese War as captain of the Naniwa. The admiral also saw how effective disciplined ships moving in unity and order were against even the most formidable of enemy warships. Japan had some advantages, such of better leadership, better discipline, faster, and more accurate gunnery than their Chinese adversaries. The battle at the mouth of the Yalu River demonstrated the importance of military exercises before battle, fire control, and the proper maintenance of guns. The Japanese used these advantages to beat their Chinese opponents during the major battles of the war and would have the same advantages over the Russians ten years later.8

The Imperial Japanese Navy received new warships for the challenges of the twentieth century. The Japanese government ordered the commencing of the Ten Year Naval Expansion Program in 1896, which initiated the purchases of new warships from Great Britain in particular. Japan ordered three battleships of the Shikishima class, designed by G. C. Macrow, from Britain each of which had a standard displacement of 14,850 tons, four twelve-inch guns, and a top speed of 18 knots. Japan also purchased two battleships of the Kashima class which had the same primary armaments as the Shikishima class, but were faster and were eighteen feet longer, at 456ft. The pride of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Vice Admiral Togo’s flagship was the final battleship of the Ten Year Program, Mikasa. She had a standard displacement of 15,140 tons and was 432 feet long with a complement of 830 officers and crew. Mikasa was armed with four twelve-inch guns and fourteen six-inch guns. Her triple expansion steam engines could produce 15,000 indicated horsepower and were capable of reaching eighteen knots. Mikasa was completed in 1902 by Vickers of Barrow and was the most powerful battleship in the world at her time. Although constructed too late to be in the Russo-Japanese War, Satsuma broke with tradition and became the first battleship constructed in Japan. Japan became increasingly independent of foreign firms in constructing warships.9

The Imperial Russian Navy was among the most powerful in the world with over twenty battleships in three separate fleets, which were based in the Baltic, Far East, and the Black Sea. This meant that it would be extremely difficult to unite their naval forces into one concentrated fleet. The Russian Navy, like the Japanese, often purchased its warships from other nations. Retvisan was purchased from Cramp’s Yard in Philadelphia, USA. Although she was smaller than the Kashima class, Retvisan could reach speeds of 18 knots and was armed with four twelve-inch guns. The five battleships of the Borodino class and Tsarevitch had similar speeds and the same primary armament as the Retvisan. This demonstrates that Japan’s and Russian’s most advanced battleships had similar armament and could reach at least eighteen knots on paper. If this was the case, why were the results of the war so lopsided?10

The Russian naval presence in the Far East was impressive with its naval bases at Vladivostok and Port Arthur, China. Port Arthur was under Russian control with a sizeable fleet based there as of early 1904 with seven battleships, six cruisers, twenty-five destroyers, two torpedo gunboats, and two minelayers. Admiral Togo had a fleet of six battleships, fourteen cruisers, nineteen destroyers, and fourteen torpedo vessels. Another Japanese squadron had two battleships, seven cruisers, and six gunboats to reinforce Togo if necessary. The closest significant reinforcements Russians could call upon outside the Yellow Sea were four cruisers and seventeen torpedo gunboats in Vladivostok. The Russian Navy could reinforce Port Arthur or Vladivostok from the other Russian bases in the Baltic and Black seas with enough battleships to double the number of battleships the Japanese had at sea.11

The Japanese government, under the former navy minister, Prime Minister Yamamoto, decided that Japan must launch a surprise attack against the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in order to gain a strategic advantage over the Russians. This would allow for Japanese troops to be carried to the Korean Peninsula. On February 8, 1904, Adm. Togo launched a torpedo attack twice on Port Arthur and caught the entire fleet off guard. The attacking Japanese were spotted by a pair of Russian destroyers, who could not effectively communicate with the rest of the fleet. As a result, the Japanese managed to launch a surprise attack against the Russians, but the results were less than satisfactory. Only three Russian battleships were hit, however, the Japanese fleet successfully organized a blockade of Port Arthur with the help of mines and a narrow harbor entrance. The Japanese would lay siege to Port Arthur by land and would make things extremely difficult for the Russians there. Togo attempted to scuttle merchant vessels at the harbor entrance but failed thanks to a quick Russian response. Despite the failure of the Japanese to obstruct the harbor entrance, the Russian fleet was still at a disadvantage since Japan had a greater command of the sea. This meant that Japan could land its army on mainland Asia to attack Russian forces and that Japanese troops could be reinforced and supplied without being harried by Russian warships.12

How much of a factor was leadership during the Russo-Japanese War? The Japanese Commander and Chief, Togo Heihachiro was an experienced commander who had gained the respect of his men. The Japanese believed that they could defeat the Russians before the war had commenced. Togo also had planned what he was going to do before he commenced his operations, was patient, and did not give up when faced with a challenge. For example, as a young officer, he rammed the Yoshino aground but continued his career rather than committing suicide. There was also good leadership in the ranks of lower officers as well. One such Japanese officer, Lieutenant Tikovara had confidence in his vessel and in his crew that they would complete their task. The common sailor had an attitude of respect and confidence towards his officer. This turned out to be a great advantage over their Russian counterpart.13

The Russian leadership had some strong personalities, such as Admiral Makarov, whose courageous leadership gave inspiration to his men. He would personally lead sorties against Japanese warships despite the risk to his own life. Unfortunately for the Russians, many of their officers were not as capable as their Japanese counterparts. Admiral Makarov noticed that his captains had the utmost difficulty doing the most basic tasks, such as getting into formation. The “risk nothing” policy of the Imperial Russian Navy was demonstrated in actions of many officers, for only the Russian cruiser Novik showed consistent boldness in the face of enemy fire. Admiral Makarov was an inspiration to his men. He personally led a sortie from his flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk, with her sister ship Poltava and four cruisers. His fleet had turned around upon meeting a superior force, but in the ensuing chaos the Petropavlovsk blew up and sank with the admiral on board. When Makarov died, the best of the Russian leadership in Port Arthur was gone.14

Admiral Makarov’s successor was the cautious Rear Admiral Vilgelm Karlovich Vitgeft who was ordered by the Viceroy to escape the doomed Port Arthur. On the early morning June 23, the Russian fleet at Port Arthur made a desperate attempt to escape to the port of Vladivostok. Vitgeft had to navigate his fleet through waters infested with mines and watch out for the Japanese fleet. The mines had taken a toll on the Japanese fleet, for two battleships were sunk by them and a cruiser was rammed and subsequently sank. Vitgeft’s six battleships, five cruisers, and seven destroyers were detected, so he turned around and headed back to port with the battleship, Sevastopol damaged by a mine. Such action demonstrated the sheer lack of confidence that the admiral had in his fleet and how indecisive he was as a commander. Admiral Vitgeft did not order his fleet out again until he received a direct order from Tsar Nicholas to clear the harbor and set course for Vladivostok. Only then did Vitgeft claim the superiority of the Russian fleet over the Japanese.15

Admiral Vitgeft’s indecision cost him, for another battleship was damaged by a mine. This time, the Russian fleet included six battleships, four cruisers, and eight destroyers with Adm. Vitgeft in the Tsarevitch as his flagship. Togo had only four effective battleships, nineteen cruisers, and forty-six destroyers that could deal with Adm. Vitgeft’s fleet. However, the Imperial Japanese Navy was spread throughout the region. Vitgeft hoped that he would evade the larger portion of the Japanese fleet, but the Russian warships could only reach fifteen knots rather than the eighteen they could reach on paper. Togo was relentless and did not give up despite initially giving up the chase, so he reengaged the Russian fleet an hour and fifteen minutes later. In this engagement, the Russians were disadvantaged by their smokeless Pyroxyline shells which, upon hitting an enemy vessel, would be less visible to the gunners. This would make it harder to determine if a gunner hit his enemy and therefore find the range of the enemy’s warships.

Vitgeft hoped that the coming darkness would cover his fleet, making it nearly impossible for the Japanese to destroy his fleet. Unfortunately for Vitgeft, two twelve-inch shells hit the Tsarevitch, knocking down the foremast tower, destroying the conning tower, killing the second-in-command, and leaving only part of Vitgeft’s leg to be found. Utter chaos ensued for the Russian fleet as the Tsarevitch circled out of control, leaving the Russian fleet in confusion. The next in command was Rear Admiral Prince Ukhtomski on Peresvyet who set a course back to Port Arthur with the orders of “Follow me.” In the confusion of the night, the Russian fleet was scattered and none made it to their original destination, Vladivostok. The Russian Port Arthur fleet was as good as destroyed and would never leave the port under Russian command again.16

Russia was not about to give up and decided that it would commit the Baltic Fleet in an attempt to defeat Japan. The Russian fleet would be put under the command of Rear Admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski, who had the difficult task of sailing around twenty thousand miles from the Baltic to Vladivostok. The Baltic Fleet was renamed the Second Pacific Squadron. Rozhdestvenski divided his seven battleships into two divisions. The first had the newer battleships Knyaz Suvorov, Imperator Aleksandr III, Borodino, and Orel, while the second division had the older Oslyabya, Sisoi Veliky, Navarin, and Admiral Nakhimov, the latter of which was not considered powerful enough to be a battleship by Rozhdestvenski. The Russian fleet included thirty-one other vessels, including cruisers and destroyers. To counter this threat, Adm. Togo had six battleships and ordered sixteen warships to patrol the straits of Tsushima.17

The battle at Tsushima commenced when the Russian flagship, Suvorov fired at the Japanese fleet while the Japanese were making a one hundred-eighty degree turn in an attempt to cross the Russian “T”. At 1:55, Togo signaled, “The Empire’s fate depends on the result of this battle. Let every man do his utmost duty.” Suvorov was hit, her conning tower was damaged and Adm. Rozhdestvenski became yet another Russian casualty. Suvorov was later sent to the bottom courtesy of the Japanese Navy. Togo was nearly killed on Mikasa, which was hit ten times. Of these, five detonated and two managed to pierce the battleship’s armor. The battle lasted throughout the day and by 8:00 in the evening, Borodino was sunk either by the twelve-inch guns of Fuji or by a torpedo from Chihaya. Oslyabya and Alexansdr III had joined her at the bottom of the ocean. The darkness of night became cover for the Japanese torpedo craft, which managed to sink the battleship Navarin and cripple Sisoi Veliky, as well as, the cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh.18

By daybreak on May 15, the only effective Russian battleships were Imperator Nikolai I and Orel. The fleet’s commanding officer was Rear Admiral Nebogatov since Rozhdestvenski was rendered unconscious. Nebogatov realized that there was no way to escape the Japanese onslaught and surrendered seven Russian vessels. A total of half of the Russian fleet sunk, six escaped to be interned in neutral ports such as Manila, one reached as far as Madagascar, and two were scuttled. The Russian casualties included 4,830 officers and men dead, 5,917 were captured, and 1,862 were held in neutral ports. Only two destroyers and one cruiser reached Vladivostok and Russia was defeated by a new naval power. The Japanese fleet had achieved a decisive victory with only 117 killed and 583 wounded. No capital ships were irreparably damaged and only three torpedo vessels were sunk.19

How did the Japanese fleet manage to win such victory over the Russian fleet without numerical superiority? The most important single factor for the Japan victory is believed to be speed, because had the Russian fleet been fast enough, it may have out run the Japanese and reached Vladivostok. Speed had allowed for the Japanese to outmaneuver the Russians, but weren’t the Russians just as fast as the Japanese? A fleet can only go as fast as the slowest vessel, but on paper, the Japan’s slowest armored warship was Fuji, which was not much faster than the Russian Imperator Nikolai I, both of which could reach at least fourteen knots. During the battle, the Russian fleet did not exceed ten knots, but the Japanese fleet reached speeds of fourteen to fifteen knots. One reason that the Russian vessels were not capable of their designed speeds was that the Russians were not as willing to put their engines under any unnecessary stress after such a long voyage. Furthermore, the Russians lacked experience operating at high speeds and the hulls of their vessels had not been cleaned of various forms of sea-life that were attached, which slowed the Russian warships down. On the other hand, the Japanese had recently careened their vessels and did not have travel too far for repairs.20

Other factors included superior Japanese discipline and gunnery skills with better officers and crew. Despite having a navy with half as many people as the Russian navy, Japan’s naval personnel were better because they were all volunteer, had longer sea service, and were more professional. The most professional of Russia’s crew were already stationed in the Far East at the start of the conflict. The Baltic Fleet had mostly inexperienced crew, which demonstrated their lack of gunnery skills near the Kronstadt in Denmark and their lack of discipline in the Dogger Bank incident. Many of the new sailors did not have much of an opportunity to get to know their engines. The Japanese gunners were more experienced, more accurate, and had a higher rate of fire. In the span of one minute, the Russians could fire five-hundred pounds of high explosives, while the Japanese could fire seven-thousand and five hundred pounds of higher quality munitions. The Japanese shimose, or lyddite-type explosive, was effective against Russian warships. Japanese gunners also had more practice, particularly at long range, than the Russians.21

The Imperial Japanese Navy had managed to destroy two Russian fleets during the Russo-Japanese War. Its success is noted as some of the most decisive victories in naval history. Japan had built up its fleet through years of industrial and economic development, but it also had created an ideology that promoted militarism and naval expansionism. Japan’s navy had built itself on the British model in hopes of emulating Great Britain’s maritime success through rigid discipline, military exercises, good leadership, good warships, and a certain confidence that Japan’s Russian enemy had lacked throughout much of the conflict.

1 Schencking, J Charles, The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed consciousness of a South Seas Destiny 1872-1921 (Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1999) 769-784.

2 Schencking, J Charles, The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny 1872-1921, 769-773.

3 David Flath, The Japanese Economy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 190-191.

4 David Flath, The Japanese Economy, 190-191;

Schencking, J Charles, The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed consciousness of a South Seas Destiny 1872-1921 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1999), 774.

5 Perry, John “Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval Power,” Monumenta Nipponica 21 No. ¾, (1966), 305-321.

6 David Flath, The Japanese Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 190-191;

Schencking, J Charles, The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny 1872-1921 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1999), 30-34.

7 David Flath, The Japanese Economy, 36.

8 Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun (New York: Stephan Howarth, 1983), 26-33; John Perry, “Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval Power,” 316.

9 Bernard Ireland, Jane’s Battleships of the Twentieth Century, (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 64-69.

Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 54.

10 Bernard Ireland, Jane’s Battleships of the Twentieth Century, 88-90.

11 Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 63-92.

12 Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, (New York: Longman, 1987), 199-207.

Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 68-73.

13 Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 58-74.

14 Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 58-74.

15 Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 74-77.

16 Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 77-81.

17 Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 82-92.

J. Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima, (Tallahassee: Sophia University, 1970), 57.

18 J. Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima, 174-256.

Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 93-96.

19 J. Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima, 174-256.

Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 93-96.

20 J. Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima,20, 223-224.

21 J. Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima, 28, 67, 69, 71, 223, 224, 225, 227.

Stephen Howarth, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 95.